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Natural Law and the Limits to Judicial Review 
-by David F. Forte 
As Aristotle bluntly put it, "He who asks Law to rule is asking God and 
Intelligence and no others to rule; while he who asks for the rule of a human being 
is bringing in a wild beast."1 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 directs that 
the powers of government must be separated "to the end it may be a government of 
laws and not of men."2 And Chief Justice John Marshall declared, "The government 
of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of 
men."3 
Today, no one disputes that judges must uphold the rule of law. Every judge 
claims that as a sacred duty. 
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Even the plurality in Planned Parenthood v. Casey" made such a claim in 
upholding the right to an abortion. True, they in effect admitted that Roe v. Wade5 
was a decision that was without legal and constitutional justification. But, the 
plurality declared, both on the basis of stare decisis and in the face of popular 
opposition, they must uphold what was the flawed decision in Roe. Why? To 
uphold the rule of law. 
For his part, Justice Scalia tells us that he must stick to the text of the 
Constitution with only the most specific level of historical example to illuminate 
the text.6 Why? To up the rule of law. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor embrace the 
school of "legal process" that binds judges within the interstices of the technique of 
judging.7 For them, that is the rule of law. Chief Justice Rehnquist often defers to 
the legislative judgment, lest he substitute his own view of appropriate policy for 
those who have legitimate discretion in deciding such matters. Otherwise, he 
would be violating the rule of law. And Judge Bork famously decried the use of 
the unwritten natural law as a source for a judge's decision-making.8 That too 
would violate the norms of the rule of law. 
In particular, judges who embrace positivism as the touchstone of their legal 
authority claim that positivism is the best protection against judicial usurpation 
and judicial activism. They, like Judge Bork, assert that judges who avow a natural 
law provenance for their decisions are unbounded and subjective. As Justice Black 
declared, a "natural law" approach would "degrade the constitutional safeguards 
of the bill of rights and simultaneously appropriate for this Court a broad power 
which we are not authorized by the Constitution to exercise."9 
Yet it has been the positivism of the Supreme Court since World War II that 
has led to the most massive and unapologetic assertion of judicial power in our 
history. Roe v. Wade is not an example of natural law jurisprudence gone awry. It 
is an example of untrammeled positivism. 
Although positivistic jurisprudence begins with the modest declaration that 
judges should stick to the text of the Constitution as it is given to them, its very 
premise legitimates the extension of judicial power far beyond the text. 
The essence of the positivistic justification is that the assertion of the will by 
an authoritative law-maker legitimates the force of the law. Of course, if a judge 
recognizes that the legislature is that authoritative body, the judge's decisions will 
be concomitantly limited. If he recognizes the text of the Constitution as the 
source of the authoritative action of the collective will, then that will limit his 
function. That is Robert Bork's position.10 
But if it is the will that legitimates the exercise of power, why should the 
judge posit that will in someone else? Once the judge acknowledges, as the legal 
realists noted, that judges do indeed make law, and once he accepts that fact as 
legitimate, he has agreed that his own will is indeed an authoritative source of the 
law. And once he accepts that moral proposition, there is nothing (except perhaps 
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the constraints of tradition) to prevent him from venturing outward from the text 
to rely upon his own notions of right and wrong policy to make the law. In Roe, 
Justice Blackmun admitted it in terms. "This right of privacy," he declared, "is 
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions 
upon state action, as we feel it is,"11 There was no authority given for the assertion 
of the abortion right outside of the judges' own desires. In Federalist 78, 
Hamilton declared that the liberty of the people "can never be endangered" from 
the judiciary "so long as the judiciary remain distinct from both the legislature 
and the executive."12 The Court's assertion of its will as sufficient justification for 
its decree in Roe made it, in essence, indistinct from the legislature. 
History indicates that it is natural law, not positivism, that provides a surer 
limit to judicial excess. As Justice Frankfurter indicated in contesting a positivistic 
theory of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, "In the history of thought 'natural 
law' has a much longer and much better founded meaning and justification than 
such subjective selection of the first eight Amendments for incorporation into the 
Fourteenth."13 But where did Justice Frankfurter find such a proposition? After all, 
he was a disciple of positivism of the Holmes. What caused the turn? And what 
did he mean by natural law? 
Documentary evidence gives us little guidance. Though a positivist, Frankfurter 
was certainly educated enough to know about the natural law tradition, even though 
it was out of favor in the academy. Yet being in the school that resolutely opposed 
natural law, Frankfurter's mention of it is surprising. It certainly surprised Justice 
Black, whose outrage may fairly be imputed partially to the connection at the time 
between natural law theory and the Roman Catholic tradition, a tradition Black had 
been famous in decrying since his days with the Ku Klux Klan.14 Frankfurter, after 
all, was a Jew. And perhaps it was that, in 1947, that made him, like some other 
positivists, recognize the validity of natural law in the face of the pure positivism 
of the Final Solution. 
Thus though Frankfurter was not trained to "reason" in the natural law tradition, 
he knew it meant a grounding in certain fundamental authoritative norms, and 
believed those norms to be few and general, and certainly not the extensive list of 
specific rights in the Bill of Rights that Black wished to incorporate into the 
Fourteenth Amendment through the due process clause. 
If Frankfurter's advice had been followed, the Supreme Court would have 
been far more modest about finding particular "rights" unrelated to any moral, 
philosophical, or legal tradition upon which the American Constitution was based. 
Instead, Black's positivism paved the way for the expansion of the Court's desire 
to remake the Constitution, and nothing Black could do in his later years could 
stem the flow he had let loose. 
But the connection of judicial restraint to natural law is not merely a function 
of the historical record. It is an aspect of the internal workings of natural law itself. 
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A judge operating under the norms of natural law is more respectful of his 
limitations under positive law than a positivist is.15 A positivist must acknowledge 
that the will is the authenticator of the law. But a natural law judge knows precisely, 
as Alexander Hamilton noted, that he is empowered by "neither Force nor Will, 
but merely judgement"16 in his functions. Without will as an authenticator, a judge 
has no authority to supersede authoritatively passed positive law. 
Long ago, St. Thomas Aquinas enunciated that truth. Not only does a judge 
act unlawfully, he said, when he decided a case on his subjective knowledge 
instead of the facts as presented to him in court,17 but such a judge has no authority 
to decide outside of the written law at all.18 In order to show that the judge was not 
basing his decision on mere subjective preference, Aquinas requires a judge to 
give reasons, so that the objective basis of his judgment can be known.19 
More particularly, St. Thomas explains: positive law contains both rights 
deriving from natural law and rights deriving from positive law itself. Positive law 
does not establish natural rights, but only "contains" or effectuates them. But posi-
tive law does establish positive rights, or what we would call entitlements. Most 
policies of any regime are neutral in terms of the natural law. "For positive right 
has no place except where it matters not, according to the natural right, whether a 
thing be done in one way, or in another."20 Any number of choices are available 
before the lawgiver. Those choices, thousands upon thousands of them, are 
emplaced in the positive law. A judge's basic function is to give effect, as honestly 
and fairly as he can, to the choices made by legislative authority, for a judge gains 
his authority by the lawgiver only to effectuate the written law of the lawgiver. If 
he goes beyond the written law, his judgment is "perverse."21 
Thus the natural law judge is more securely respectful of the positive law 
precisely because he knows the limits of his authority. His will is of no account. 
But what about those rare instances when the lawgiver himself violates the 
norms of natural law? First, a judge properly respectful of the authority of the 
legislature would be wary of presuming that a law flies in the face of an imperative 
norm. Further, a judge would be morally bound to turn his craft to interpret a law in 
such a way that any possible ambiguity would be read as being not in conflict with 
any higher norm. But in the end, what if a state legislature does depart radically 
from a primary natural law norm? What if the police do it? The logic is 
inescapable. "If the written law contains anything contrary to the natural right, it is 
unjust and has no binding force."22 Just as a judge has no authority to make new 
positive law, the lawgiver has no authority to make positive law that is patently 
and inescapably contrary to natural law. And if a judge should enforce such a law, 
the judge himself would be acting unlawfully.21 
Chief Justice John Marshall made this logical point the centerpiece of his 
argument in Marbury v. Madison, the very case that established the right of the 
Supreme Court to review positive law. The Court, it was argued, was not superior 
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to Congress in determining whether a law was constitutional. If Congress, in good 
faith, believed a statute was in conformity with the Constitution, the Court should 
defer to the Congress's judgement. 
That misses the point, Marshall in effect said. True the Court is only a coequal 
branch. It is not innately superior to Congress in the constitutional scheme. But the 
judges of the Supreme Court are under a duty to decide cases according to the law. 
They have no authority to do anything else. They have undertaken an oath to support 
the Constitution. Congress has decreed that judges must take an additional oath to 
the same effect. "How immoral to impose it on them," Marshall bristled, "If they 
were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating 
what they swear to support"! Marshall continued, "If such be the real state of 
things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, 
becomes equally a crime."24 In sum, it would be a "crime," if the Court, after 
swearing to uphold the law, should enforce an act that was not truly law. The 
Court simply has no authority to do such a thing. 
Thus, the very premise of judicial review in America is rooted in the structure 
of natural law. Judges have no authority to make any kind of law. They can only 
enforce and apply authoritatively passed positive law. But if the positive law has 
not been enacted, either in form or substance, without proper authority, then if the 
judge should enforce such a law, he would in fact be making new positive law, and 
would be acting outside of his authority. 
Under the principles of the natural law and under the first principles of judicial 
review in this country, both judicial restraint and the rule of law are truly maintained. 
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